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Foreword 
The Wuppertal Institute has compiled a concise and inspiring overview of countries and stake-
holders, their neutrality targets and concrete strategies. One important feature is the combination 
of credible domestic action with compensation/offsets for the remaining emissions. The overview 
also highlights the broad range of possible timelines for neutrality ambition.
The many different instruments and the target years involved inspire and facilitate debate and
dialogue on the usefulness and optimum design of neutrality targets relative to climate leadership
and raising ambition. Acknowledging the necessity for collectively and individually raised ambi-
tion, this is especially important in the lead up to the facilitative dialogue in 2018. 
 Germany has an ambitious climate strategy but no national neutrality target as such; there are,
however, some areas that have adopted offsetting or overall neutrality targets. Federal Govern-
ment travel is offset with high-quality CDM credits and one of the goals of Germany’s National
Sustainability Strategy is to make Federal Government activities carbon-neutral by 2030. 
All COP23 emissions, including those from aviation, will be offset. 
Dr. Silke Karcher 
Head of Division KI I 6, European and International Climate Policy, New Market Mechanisms
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Summary
In the Paris Agreement, the governments of the 
world have agreed to achieve climate neutrality 
in the second half of this century. More precise-
ly, in Art. 4.1 Parties agreed to “achieve a bal-
ance between anthropogenic emissions by 
sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse 
gases“. 
While the collective as well as the majority of
efforts by individual countries fall short of em-
barking on a pathway toward that end, an in-
creasing number of actors – countries, sub-
national entities, as well as corporations – have 
stepped up their efforts and set themselves 
carbon neutrality goals.
This Policy Brief portrays the commitments of 
Costa Rica, Norway, Sweden, as well as the City 
of Melbourne in Australia and Microsoft. All
cases have set themselves ambitious neutrality 
goals and have implemented measures to 
achieve them. However, none of the cases will 
be able to achieve climate neutrality on their 
own, at least not in the short run. Remaining 
emissions will be compensated using carbon 
credits either from domestic offset schemes 
(Costa Rica) or from international schemes.
For the time being, voluntary carbon neutrality 
goals, as presented in this Policy Brief, are an 
effective way to demonstrate leadership. For 
the foreseeable future, pioneering actors that 
assume voluntary carbon or climate neutrality 
goals could provide a significant source of de-
mand for international carbon credits.





















Lukas Hermwille & Markus Gornik
1 Introduction  
With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the 
world has agreed on a global climate neutrality 
goal. The global temperature goal – “[h]olding 
the increase in the global average temperature 
to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels 
and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature 
increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels” 
(UNFCCC, 2016b, Art. 2.1a) – is further opera-
tionalized in Article 4. The latter effectively de-
fines carbon neutrality:
“In order to achieve the long-term temperature 
goal set out in Article 2, Parties aim to reach 
global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as 
soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will 
take longer for developing country Parties, and 
to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in ac-
cordance with best available science, so as to 
achieve a balance between anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of 
greenhouse gases in the second half of this
century, on the basis of equity, and in the con-
text of sustainable development and efforts to 
eradicate poverty “ (UNFCCC, 2016b, Art. 4.1)
While the time horizon of the set goal is not 
particularly clear in the Paris Agreement, vari-
ous analyses have been conducted to this end.
The UNEP Emissions Gap Report summarizes 
these analyses and concludes that in order to 
attain the 2 °C limit (with a 66% chance) it 
would be necessary to phase out CO2 emissions 
from energy and industry by ~2070 and total
GHG emissions by 2085. For the more ambi-
tious 1.5 °C goal (50% chance of attainment) 
CO2 emissions from energy and industry would 
have to be phased out some time between 
2045-2055 and total GHG emissions need to 
cease to be emitted by 2060-2080 (UNEP, 2016).
What is more, the last sub-clause of Art. 4.1 im-
plies that industrialized countries must take the 
lead. According to the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities enshrined in the original Frame-
work Convention, it is their responsibility to
achieve a net balance of GHG emissions and 
removals by sinks earlier than their developing 
country counterparts and hence earlier than the 
global aggregate. Unfortunately, the Paris 
Agreement lacks any formal operationalization 
of equity. In no way does the agreement go be-
yond the aggregate level and provide an indi-
cation which country or sector is expected to 
achieve climate neutrality at what point in time. 
Nevertheless, several countries have indicated 
voluntary that they intend to achieve climate or 
carbon neutrality1: 
•  Costa Rica originally pledged to become 
carbon neutral by 2021. However, in its 
INDC, it has revised its initially more ambi-
tious goal and now plans to achieve zero 
net emissions (climate neutrality) by 2085
(Government of Costa Rica & MINAE, 2015; 
MINEAT, 2009);
•  Norway has proposed to become carbon 
neutral by 2030 (Norwegian Ministry of the 
Environment, 2012);
•  Sweden and Finland intend to achieve car-
bon neutrality by 2045 (Climate Home,
2017; Ministry of the Environment of 
Finland, 2017).
A couple of other countries had communicated 
similar plans, but did not follow up ever since.
This includes, for example, New Zealand (Helen 
Clark, 2007). Also, Ethiopia has announced to 
become carbon neutral as it transitions to a 
middle income country. The country has put 
forward a very ambitious INDC and aims to be 
 
1 for a differentiation of the two concepts see box on 
page 2 
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come a middle income country by 2025, yet it 
has not specified whether and how remaining 
emissions will be offset. Instead Ethiopia has 
expressed its intention to supply carbon credits 
(Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2015).
Alongside these countries, non-state and sub-
national actors increasingly step up their cli-
mate action. A growing number of cities and 
corporations has committed to carbon or cli-
mate neutrality. In section 3 we present two ex-
amples in more detail: the City of Melbourne 
and Microsoft.  
It is the goal of this Policy Brief to provide an
overview of the increasing number of voluntary 
carbon/climate goals. In section 2, the three 
most advanced national neutrality goals will be
explored: Costa Rica, Norway, and Sweden. The 
assessment elaborates on the following ques-
tions:
•  What has been committed and by when?
•  What is the legal/political status of these 
commitments? 
•  What are the challenges faced by the coun-
tries in implementing the goal and by 
which means/policies are these challenges 
addressed? 
•  What role do they foresee for internation-
al/domestic offsetting? 
Section 3 then provides a scant overview of 
neutrality commitments made by non-state and 
subnational actors. This overview will be com-
plemented and illustrated by two exemplary 
cases mentioned above.
Section 4 discusses the findings by inter alia re-
flecting the role of voluntary neutrality pledges 
in the light of the aggregate objectives of the 
Paris Agreement and highlighting potential im-
plications for international carbon trading.
Carbon vs. Climate Neutrality 
Carbon neutrality is referred to as the net bal-
ance between anthropogenic carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions and removals by carbon sinks. 
Sinks can be either natural – CO2 stored in bio-
mass, soils or oceans – or artificial when CO2 is 
stored in the built environment (think of wood-
en buildings) or stored in geological formations 
by industrial processes (CCS).  
However, CO2 emissions only cover about two 
thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions. Other 
GHGs are methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). Under the 
Kyoto Protocol, all these gases were considered 
in the so-called basket approach. The global 
warming potential of CO2 (over 100 years) has 
been used as a point of reference to calculate 
conversion factors for all other GHGs. In so do-
ing, it was possible to come up with a common 
metric for all GHGs expressed in CO2 equivalents 
(CO2e).  
Climate or GHG neutrality is thus the more en-
compassing goal since it covers all gases and 
implies a net balance of CO2e (UNEMG, UNEP, 
GRID-Arendal 2008: 14). 
While for entire nation states, climate neutrality 
should be the ultimate goal and in fact is what 
countries have committed to collectively in the 
Paris Agreement, for non-state and subnational 
actors it may be more appropriate and practical, 
especially when they hardly contribute to emis-
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2 Country-Wide Strategies  
2.1 Costa Rica:  
Carbon Neutrality by 2021 
2.1.1 Status of the Goal 
In the year 2007, then President Oscar Arias de-
clared that Costa Rica would become the 
world’s first carbon-neutral country by the year 
of its 200th anniversary of independence. Since 
then, a long list of plans and strategies has been 
brought forward.
A first step towards the carbon neutral goal was 
the adoption of National Climate Change Strat-
egy – NCCS (Estrategia Nacional de Cambio
Climático – ENCC) by Costa Rica’s Environmen-
tal Ministry in 2009. This document set the 
timeline for becoming a Climate Neutral econ-
omy by the year 2021 through a sustainable 
development strategy with an associated low
carbon emission pathway. In the strategy, the 
goal is defined as climate neutrality, i.e. a bal-
ance between anthropogenic GHG emissions 
and the removal of CO2 sequestered in the 
countries tropical forests (MINEAT, 2009).
The mitigation strategy is structured around 
three main action areas. The first, reduction of 
GHG emissions by sources, aims to identify
emission sources and develop opportunities for 
reductions in eight sectors. The second area of 
action addresses carbon sequestration in for-
ests and reforestation. Complementing the 
scheme on mitigation, the third area refers to 
emission compensation via international car-
bon markets and encompasses the develop-
ment of local markets, national programs for 
compensation payments, voluntary markets 
and participation in international schemes, such 
as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
(Nachmany et al., 2015). 
All things considered, the Costa Rican neutrality 
goal is strongly institutionalized and implemen-
tation is well under way.
2.1.2 The Challenge Ahead 
On 13 October 2016, Costa Rica ratified the Par-
is Agreement. However, in its Nationally Deter-
mined Contribution (NDC) the references to its 
carbon neutrality goal is somewhat ambiguous.
On the one hand, Costa Rica “reaffirm[s] its aspi-
ration of becoming a Carbon Neutral economy 
starting year 2021” (Government of Costa Rica & 
MINAE, 2015, p. 2). The formal INDC target 
communicated, on the other hand, does not 
align with this aspiration. For 2030 Costa Rica 
has committed to keep emissions below 9.37 
MtCO2e. Net neutrality of emissions is now tar-
geted for in 2085 only (Government of Costa 
Rica & MINAE, 2015).
According to government officials, the back-
tracking from the more ambitious earlier goal in
part is a result of better insights into the coun-
tries’ GHG inventories. New forest accounting 
practices revealed that Costa Rica’s mature for-
ests are sequestering much less CO2 per annum 
than initially assumed (Replogle, 2015).
For Costa Rica, the biggest remaining challenge 
concerns emissions from transportation. Costa 
Rica’s CO2 emissions from fuel combustion al-
most exclusively originate from oil and petrole-
um products, the bulk of which (71%) is petrol
and diesel in the transport sector (IEA, 2016a). A 
key mitigation strategy pursued therefore is to 
incentivize fuel switch for final use in the 
transport sector, mainly towards electric trans-
portation.
The power sector, though, already is almost 
emission free since only less than 10% of the 





























































       
#!#&# #!!&%$" 
$"#!$# !" !# 
"# #! 
Steps Towards Carbon Neutrality

electricity is generated by fossil fuelled plants 
(66% hydro, 15% geothermal, 7.2% solar & wind 
power) (IEA, 2016b). Still, Costa Rica prioritizes 
energy efficiency to reduce demand and has set 
itself an aspirational goal to reach 100% renew-
able energy in 2030 (Government of Costa Rica 
& MINAE, 2015; Government of Costa Rica, MI-
NAE, DSE, & UNDP, 2015). Some 13.7% of the 
country’s emissions (including emissions from 
coal consumption) stem from manufacturing 
industries and construction. Costa Rica is also a 
country with rich tropical forests. Enhancing 
carbon sequestration in forests and reforesta-
tion are therefore also key priorities in the 
country’s mitigation strategy. The LUCF (land 
use change and forestry) sector currently re-
moves from the atmosphere an estimated 11.32 
MtCO2 per year (WRI, 2013).
Costa Rica also relies on voluntary contributions 
from its private sector. A key component of the 
national strategy in this regard is promoting a 
“C-Neutral-label” to certify that tourism and cer-
tain industries mitigate all of the carbon dioxide 
they emit. Under the certification system, tour-
ists and businesses will be charged a voluntary 
fee to offset their carbon emissions. The money 
is used to fund conservation, reforestation, and 
research in protected areas (MINEAT, 2009).
2.1.3 The Role of Offsetting 
Costa Rica has decided to complement its do-
mestic mitigation strategy with a scheme for 
emission compensation (carbon markets) that 
focuses on the development of local markets, 
national programs for compensation payments,
voluntary markets and participation in interna-
tional schemes, such as the CDM. Costa Rica’s 
Voluntary Domestic Carbon Market was estab-
lished in 2013. Its key features are presented in 
the following:
•  companies looking to become carbon neu-
tral or offset their emissions purchase car-
bon credits through BanCO2 for unavoida-
ble emissions.
•  BanCO2 is a 2013 established national envi-
ronmental bank, which serves as a market
platform for trade of UCCs (Costa Rica’s
carbon credits). These tradable units allow
Figure 1: Costa Rican CO2 emissions from fuel combustion 
by fuel. Source: IEA (2016a). individual people and companies to offset  
their GHG emissions.
•  The National Forestry Financing Fund (FO-
NAFIFO) approves the carbon certificates.
The fund receives a payment through the
transaction between a buyer of credits and
BanCO2. The revenues are used to secure
the future of the fund’s Payments for Eco-
system Services (PES) program.
Since Costa Rica is using its own proprietary 
crediting scheme, it is not possible without 
substantial research to assess the quality of the 
Figure 2: Costa Rican CO2 emissions from fuel combustion 
by sector. Source: IEA (2016a). 
issued certificates. Such an analysis is beyond 
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2.2 Norway:  
Carbon Neutrality by 2030 
2.2.1 Status of the Goal 
Originally, Norway had proposed to become 
carbon neutral in 2050. This initial target was 
based on a political consensus achieved in
2012. In the corresponding White Paper on the 
Norwegian Climate Policy, the Norwegian gov-
ernment outlined that Norway would unilater-
ally commit to carbon neutrality by 2030. The 
white paper also states that 
As part of an ambitious global climate agree-
ment where other developed nations also take 
on ambitious commitments, Norway will 
adopt a binding goal of carbon neutrality no 
later than in 2030. This means that Norway will 
commit to achieving emission reductions 
Lukas Hermwille & Markus Gornik
erage of the EU. The biggest sources of CO2  
emissions from fuel combustion in terms of sec-
tors are transport with 14.04 MtCO2 (10.6 MtCO2  
of which amount to road transport) and the 
country’s oil and gas industry. Some 10.93 
MtCO2 are emitted in oil refineries and at sites 
of oil and natural gas extraction (IEA, 2016a).  
Like Costa Rica, Norway has hardly any CO2  
emissions in the power sector since electricity 
generation is dominated by hydro power. In 
2015, only about 2.3% of electricity was gener-
ated from combustible fuels (IEA, 2016b).  
Norway’s forests are a significant carbon sink 
and currently sequester an estimated 26.7 
MtCO2 per annum (Norwegian Ministry of Cli-
mate and Environment, 2015). 
abroad equivalent to Norwegian emissions in  
2030. (Norwegian Ministry of the Environ-
ment, 2012)  
This target was reiterated in the country’s NDC  
in the context of the Paris Agreement. More  
specifically, Norway has unconditionally com-
mitted to reduce GHG emissions to 40% below 
the levels of 1990 in 2030 (Government of Nor-
way, 2015). 
As regards the conditional commitment, the 
same language has been used as in the 2012 
white paper quoted above. Whether or not the 
Paris Agreement and the NDCs by other devel-
oped countries meet the conditions outlined in
Norway’s NDC is still under discussion. Norway’s 
Figure 3: Norway's CO2 emissions from fuel combustion 
by fuel. Source: IEA (2016a). 
goal (Norway, 2017).
2.2.2 The Challenge Ahead 
Despite its advantageous situation in terms of 
rich renewable energy potentials, in 2012 Nor- Figure 4: Norway's CO2 emissions from fuel combustion
by sector. Source: IEA (2016a). way still featured CO2 emissions above the av-
5  
most recent climate act merely enshrines the  
commitments of the NDC into national law and  
prescribes an annual review process. The act  
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Key policies to address emissions for Norway 
are pricing instruments: a carbon tax and the 
participation in the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS). The EU ETS covers emissions 
from land-bound manufacturing industries 
such as cement, steel, and pulp and paper, but 
also the biggest chunk of Norwegian industrial 
emissions, namely emissions from the offshore 
oil and gas extraction industry (Norwegian Min-
istry of Climate and Environment, 2015).
Not covered are, however, transport emissions. 
To this end, Norway has prioritized railway in-
frastructure over road infrastructure. The coun-
try has also introduced aggressive policies for 
the promotion of electric vehicles and has con-
sequently become a leading market for elec-
tromobility (Norwegian Ministry of Climate and
Environment, 2015).
Apart from that, Norway has been a leading 
country in the development of technologies for 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies 
and has expressed its intention to continue on 
that road (Norwegian Ministry of Climate and 
Environment, 2015).
With respect to transport emissions, Norway 
has advanced substantially. Strong fiscal incen-
tives and a campaign to set up the required in-
frastructure has lead to a surge in sales of elec-
tric vehicles in the country (Figenbaum, 2016).
But the second largest share of remaining emis-
sions will be much more difficult to address: 
emissions from fossil fuel extraction. Ironically,
Norway does not even use much of the oil and 
gas extracted on its own but exports most of it.
Norway has opted to address these emissions 
through the EU ETS and oil and gas companies 
are not entitled for any free allocations but 
need to purchase all their allowances. However,
current price levels in the EU ETS are rather low,
too low probably to effectively drive down 
emissions from oil and gas extraction. Moreo-
ver, not being a member of the EU, Norway has 
very limited leverage to change this. It may 
therefore well be the case that, at least with the 
current instruments, Norway will not be able to
achieve its neutrality goal domestically, but 
would have to revert to international offsets. 
2.2.3 The Role of Offsetting 
Norway has long been a strong supporter of 
market-based instruments. This is also true for 
the CDM as well as the mechanisms to emerge 
from the Paris Agreement’s Article 6. In its latest 
submission on the matter Norway has, for ex-
ample, stated that “a UN mechanism with rules
agreed between all Parties highly valuable. This 
would limit unnecessary proliferation of con-
cepts and units in the market” (Norwegian Min-
istry of Climate and Environment, 2016).
While the Norwegian governments position 
was relatively clear and stable over the last 
years, there seems to be a political controversy 
with respect to the scale and scope to which 
offsetting is used to fulfil Norway’s carbon neu-
trality goal, this being one reason why new leg-












































2.3 Sweden:  
Carbon Neutrality by 2045 
In February 2017, the Swedish government an-
nounced its commitment to become climate 
neutral in 2045 (with gross emissions of at least 
85% below 1990 levels). The respective policy 
framework consists of the aforementioned goal,
Sweden’s first overarching climate act that en-
shrines this goal, as well as a climate policy 
council that is supposed to assist the govern-
ment, inter alia by providing evaluation of cli-
mate policies and their implementation in rela-
tion to the set goals. In June 2017, Swedish 
legislators overwhelmingly approved the pro-
posal and turned it into law (Climate Home,
2017). The climate act take effect as of January 
2018 (Government of Sweden, 2017).
The Swedish commitment is based on the rec-
ommendations of a cross-party committee on  
environmental objectives, established already  
in 2014 and tasked to develop a broad consen-
sus on environmental policy objectives and to 
consult the Swedish government on the matter
(miljomal.se, 2016). 
2.3.1 The Challenge Ahead 
As in the cases of Costa Rica and Norway, the 
largest share of remaining emissions originates 
from the transport sector. In 2014, the sector 
accounted for more than half of all emissions 
from fuel combustion and still more than a third
if all GHGs are considered (excl. emis-
sions/removals from agriculture, forestry and  
other land use). The next leading emission in-
tensive sectors are manufacturing industries  
and construction (17.4% of CO2 emissions from 
fuel combustion) and electricity and heat 
(16.8% of CO2 emissions from fuel combustion) 
(IEA, 2016a).
Emissions in the power sector are relatively low 
due to the large share of hydropower (46% in
2015) and nuclear power (35% in 2015). Since 
7 
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2010, the share of wind power has also in-
creased significantly and surpassed 10% of 
electricity generated in 2015 (IEA, 2016b).
On its way to achieving the climate neutrality 
goal, Sweden has set sectoral milestones along 
the way: a fossil free vehicle fleet by 2030 and a 
100% renewable energy target for the power 
sector by 2040. 
For the former, Sweden pursues a dual strategy. 
On the one hand, it intends to substantially in-
crease the use of biofuels in the sector. This 
strategy is complemented by a strategy to in-
crease the share of electric vehicles in the sector 
















	 	 	90  

   
C
O
Figure 5: Swedish CO2 emissions from fuel combustion by 
fuel. Source: IEA (2016a). 
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Figure 6: Swedish CO2 emissions from fuel combustion by 
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The latter target was adopted by a broad con-
sensus among all major Swedish parties in the 
Riksdag. The target is ambitious in that current-
ly 35% of electricity is produced by nuclear 
power and at least four out of ten Swedish nu-
clear reactors are scheduled to be decommis-
sioned no later than 2020. Still, the Energy Poli-
cy Commission that prepared the consensus 
stated that the 2040 target is „not a deadline for 
banning nuclear power, nor does it mean clos-
ing nuclear power plants through political deci-
sions” (Energy Policy Commission, 2017, p. 22).
2.3.2 The Role of Offsetting 
Like Norway, Sweden has been a strong propo-
nent of international carbon markets under the 
UNFCCC and has strongly utilized the CDM.
Consequently, Sweden has also proposed to re-
vert to international offsets to attain its climate 
neutrality goal. In a fact sheet issued by the 
Swedish government on the 2045 neutrality 
goal it is stated that to “achieve zero net emis-
sions, supplementary measures may be count-
ed. This can, for example, be increased uptake 
of carbon dioxide in forests and land, and in-
vestments in other countries.” (Government of 














City Target Population Annual Emissions Offsetting 
Berlin Climate Neutral by 2050 3 439 837 (2014) 21.3 million tCO2,  
6.2 tCO2 per capita 
Adelaide Carbon Neutral by 2020 1 326 354 (2016) 0.94 million tCO2e, 




Climate Neutral by 2020 138 000 (2016) 4.15 million tCO2e , 
30.1 tCO2 e per capita 
yes 
Copenhagen Carbon Neutral by 2025, Cli
mate Neutral by 2050 
591 481 (2016) 1.45 million tCO2e, 
2.4 tCO2e per capita 
Freiburg Climate Neutral by 2050 226 393 (2015) 1.73 million CO2,  
8.0 tCO2 per capita 
Ghent Climate Neutral by 2050 257 029 (2016) 1.44 million tCO2, 5.6 tCO2 
per capita 
Reykjavik  Carbon Neutral by 2040 121 230 (2014) 0.33 million tCO2, 
2.8 tCO2 per capita 
yes 
Rio de Janeiro Carbon Neutral by 2065 6 476 631 (2015) 20.3 million tCO2e, 
3.1 tCO2e per capita 
? 
Seattle Climate Neutral by 2050 662 400 (2014) 4.1 million tCO2e,  
7.0 tCO2e per capita 
yes 

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3 Non-State Actor Initiatives  
for Carbon Neutrality
Recent years have seen a strong uptake of cli-
mate change mitigation initiatives that trans-
cend the governance level of nation states.
Sub-national entities such as municipalities, civ-
il society organisations (CSO) and businesses 
have begun to lead the way on climate action,
some of them far more ambitious than their re-
spective national governments. As of July 2017,
the UNFCCC Secretariat’s NAZCA platform lists 
a total of 2508 cities, 209 regions, 2138 compa-
nies, and 238 CSOs that taken commitments on 
climate action (UNFCCC, 2017). Few of them are 
ambitious enough to commit to carbon or even 
climate neutrality, but some are.  
The subsequent section provides an overview 
of such non-state actor initiatives and presents 
more detailed examples of such commitments:
the City of Melbourne and Microsoft.
3.1 Carbon Neutral Initiatives: 
An Overview 
Urban areas account for nearly three-quarters 
of anthropogenic emissions. Due to population 
growth and increasing urbanization, urban in-
frastructures will have to double by 2050. If cur-
rent unsustainable technologies and practices 
are continued, this alone will consume about 
half of the remaining carbon budget (IPCC,
2014). Consequently, in reimagining and rein-





Table 1: Overview of cities that have committed to neutrality goals. 




















Company Sector Target/Ambition Employees Annual  
Emissions 
Offsetting 
Aviva financial services Carbon Neutral since 2006.  
Aims for Climate-Neutrality. 
27,718 165,115 tCO2e Yes 
Deutsche Post DHL logistics Climate Neutral in transporta
tions by 2050 
508,036 26.92 MtCO2e ? 
Google Inc. software / internet 
technology 
Carbon-Neutral across the value 
chain since 2007 
72,053 2.49 MtCO2e Yes 
Marks & Spencer retail (fashion) Carbon Neutral by 2020 85,813 526,000 tCO2e Yes 
Microsoft software / internet 
technology 
Carbon Neutral since June 2012. 114,000 431,251 tCO2e Yes 
Philips electronics Carbon Neutral by 2020 112,959 1.417 MtCO2 Yes 
Sony electronics Climate Neutral by 2050  125,300 1.37 MtCO2e Yes 
  
Steps Towards Carbon Neutrality
 
prosperity, social equity, enhanced quality of 
life, and climate resilience, cities have an ex-
traordinary responsibility and capacity to con-
tribute to climate change mitigation.
A large number of cities have taken up this re-
sponsibility and developed their own GHG re-
duction targets. Many focus on energy and 
have committed to organize their energy sup-
ply 100% based on renewable energy. A small
number of cities even strive to altogether 
phase-out carbon emissions. Table 1 above 
provides a non-exhaustive list of cities that have 
made such commitments.
Likewise, many companies have taken up simi-
lar commitments. Table 2 below provides some
illustrative examples of such commitments 
3.2 The City of Melbourne:  
Carbon Neutrality by 2020 
Probably the most aggressive neutrality target 
by a city is the one put forward by the City of 
Melbourne. The goal is not only ambitious be-
cause Australia features the highest per-capita-
emissions in the developed world, but also be-
cause of the short time frame for reaching the 
goal: the target year is 2020. Moreover, the City 
of Melbourne has also advanced considerably
in implementing the goal and has put into 
place respective legislation since adopting the 
goal.
As early as 2003, the City of Melbourne has pre-
sented its first “Zero Net Emissions by 2020 
Strategy” (ZNE Strategy); it has updated this
strategy in 2008 and 2014. It lays out sector-
specific intermediate goals in order to break 
down the challenge (City of Melbourne, 2014).
These include: 
•  Council operations: reduce GHG emis-
sions by 10% by 2018 based on baseline 
year 2010-2011 and offset remaining emis-
sions to achieve carbon neutrality.
•  Commercial buildings and industry: In-
crease the energy efficiency of 40% per 
building by 2018.
•  Residential buildings: Establish a baseline 
and develop a long-term target in the first 
year of the implementation plan.
•  Stationary energy supply: 25% of elec-
tricity from renewable sources by 2018.  
•  Transport and freight: Increase the per-
centage of all trips to and from the munici-
pality of Melbourne using sustainable 
transport from 51% in 2009 to 60% by 
2018.
•  Waste management: Decrease waste to 



































3.2.1 The Challenge Ahead 
The City of Melbourne is situated in the heart of 
Metropolitan Melbourne, the state capital of
Victoria and serves as the local government au-
thority responsible for the Melbourne city cen-
tre and fourteen surrounding inner-city sub-
urbs.  The residential population amounts to 
some 140,000 inhabitants. Yet, on an average 
weekday nearly 1,000,000 people commute in-
to the city. 
Between 2010 and 2020 emissions are project-
ed to grow by 5.1% annually under business-as-
usual. Studies commissioned by the municipali-
ty identified GHG emission reduction potential
of approximately 2.2 MtCO2e. This figure does 
not include emission reductions related to an 
increase of renewable energy in power supply.
Taking into account the goal of providing 25% 
of electricity supply from renewable energies,
the city can cut projected BAU emissions rough-
ly in half.  
In the fifteen years since the launch of the ZNE 
road map, Melbourne has built the foundations 
to reduce the carbon footprint significantly.
Moreover, it has implemented a series of pro-
grams collaborating with both residents and 
local businesses in order to leverage the identi-
fied mitigation potentials.
3.2.2 Role of Offsetting 
Since significant emissions will remain despite 
all efforts, the City of Melbourne will rely on off-
setting to compensate the remaining emis-
sions.
Offsetting is already being used to compensate 
emissions of the operations of the city council.
In April 2012, Melbourne endorsed the Carbon 
Neutral Strategy for Council Operations. In
2013, the City of Melbourne for the first time
achieved carbon neutral certification for the 
2011-2012 financial year of its council opera-
tions. In order to offset the remaining GHG 
emissions –  not only of the city council but of 
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the entire city in 2020 –, cost estimates are in 
the order of 30 million Australian Dollars based
on a unit price of 10$ per tonne CO2e.
For the offsets, the City of Melbourne relies on 
the Australian National Carbon Offset Standard 
(NCOS). This standard sets minimum require-
ments for calculating, reducing, offsetting, au-
diting and reporting on emissions. Moreover, it
aims to ensure the quality of offsets by limiting 
the eligibility of units. Eligibility is limited to
Australia’s domestic crediting unit (Australian 
Carbon Credit Units – ACCUs), CERs from the 
Clean Development Mechanism, Removal Units 
(RMUs) issued on the basis of land use, land-use 
change and forestry activities under article 3.3 
or 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol, and voluntary 
emission reduction units issued by the Gold
Standard or the Verified Carbon Standard. It al-
so requires participating entities to publish 
public disclosure statements on its emissions 
and the offsets used. (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2015).
3.3 Microsoft 
In March 2009, then CEO Steve Ballmer an-
nounced that by 2012, Microsoft would reduce 
its carbon emissions by at least 30% per unit of 
revenue from their 2007 levels by optimizing 
the use of technology, reducing energy con-
sumption and air travel, as well as increasing 
investments in RE and offsetting.
After the company reached this goal within
three years, Microsoft set a more ambitious tar-
get in June 2012. The new commitment was to 
become carbon neutral. Microsoft achieved this
virtually immediately by purchasing Renewable 
Energy Certificates (RECs) for the power con-
sumed and offsetting the remaining emissions 
(inter alia from air travel). Since July 2012, Mi-
crosoft has been operating 100% carbon neu-
tral for all their operations, including their data-
centres, offices, software development labs,
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manufacturing plants and business air travel 
since (Microsoft, 2016).2 
Microsoft seeks to reduce its emissions with 
strategy based on three pillars (Microsoft, 2012):   
1.  Increasing energy efficiency in its facilities 
and reducing air travel. This is supported 
and monitored via key indicators such as 
power usage effectiveness (PUE), carbon 
usage effectiveness (CUE) and water usage 
effectiveness (WUE) for data centres, energy
efficiency for software development labs,
emissions per housed employee per square 
foot for offices, and air travel miles per em-
ployee.
2.  Increasing purchases of renewable energy 
and reducing waste and water use. Mi-
crosoft invests not only in renewable ener-
gy certificates (RECs) and carbon offsets,
but also seeks to sign long-term RE power 
purchase agreements, invests directly in RE 
projects and connects its own energy-
hungry data centres to on-site RE genera-
tion and innovative methane fuel cells.  
3.  Increasing the accountability within the or-
ganization by rigorously tracking emissions 
and introducing an internal carbon fee on 
all emissions within the responsibility of Mi-
crosoft’s own groups and business units.
The collected revenue is fed into a central 
fund and used to purchase renewable en-
ergy and support sustainable energy inno-
vation, carbon offsets, and to invest into in-
ternal emission reduction measures. The 
breakdown of investments is presented in
figure 7.
 
2 Note that there is no third-party assessment of the claims
made by Microsoft. However, Microsoft reports its emis-
sion data through the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), a 
registered international not-for-profit organisation. Also 
for its GHG reporting, Micrsoft relies on the World Re-
sources Institute’s Greenhouse Gas Protocol (Microsoft, 
2017)
 
Figure 7: Microsoft’s carbon fee fund investments in the 
fiscal year 2015. *also includes e-waste recycling. 
Source: Microsoft (2015). 
Role of Offsetting 
Together with the carbon fee, carbon offset 
projects play an important role in Microsoft’s 
carbon neutrality policy. The company pur-
chases carbon credits that compensate for the 
emissions associated with their business air 
travel and any energy consumption in regions 
where they cannot procure RE. Microsoft’s car-
bon offset portfolio includes 47 projects, in 26 
countries, saving over 2 million tCO2e. Microsoft 
claims to prioritize projects that are aligned 
with the Sustainable Development Goals and 
promote community level sustainable devel-
opment (Microsoft, 2016). Microsoft has further 
limited itself to sourcing offset credits from pro-
jects certified under one of five established 
crediting schemes: the Verified Carbon Stand-
ard, the Gold Standard, the Climate Action Re-
serve, the American Carbon Registry , or the 
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In 2015, the German Federal Government decided in to offset the climate impact of all business travel 
that employees of ministries and subordinate national authorities conduct by air or by car in the cur-
rent legislative period (2014 – 2017). For air travel, this does not only include direct effects of CO2 
emissions but includes ‘non-CO2’ effects (such as water vapour, nitrogen oxides and carbon black
particle emissions) that occur at high altitudes. In total, cumulative emissions amounted to 576 908
tCO2e for the 2014-2016 period.
To compensate these emissions, the Federal German Government uses certificates generated under 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and also applies its own quality assurance criteria to sup-
port projects of especially high quality which, apart from their actual mitigation effect, have other 
positive sustainability effects such as protecting other environmental media – air, soil and water – or 
have a developmental impact by means of rural electrification, strengthening the local jobs markets,
providing further education and training for the local workforce, supporting local utility suppliers and 
assisting health protection.
To date, certificates have been used from five projects: one each on household biogas in China and 
Nepal, one on electricity generation from harvest waste in India, a wind power project in Costa Rica
and an electricity generation from landfill gas activity in Mexico. When implementing this measure, 
the Federal German Government will be assisted by the German Emissions Trading Authority
(DEHSt). The DEHSt calculates journey-related emissions, chooses the offsetting projects and is also
responsible for buying and cancelling the emission certificates required.

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4 Discussion and 
Conclusions
In order to have a chance to attain the objective 
of the Paris Agreement – to limit global warm-
ing to well below 2°C and make efforts to limit 
the temperature increase even to 1.5°C – the 
aggregate ambition of the first round of Na-
tionally Determined Contributions is insuffi-
cient (UNFCCC, 2016a). In the accompanying 
COP decisions to the Paris Agreement, Parties 
explicitly took note of that mismatch between 
ambition and (proposed) action. The confer-
ence of the Parties noted “with concern”
“that the estimated aggregate greenhouse gas  
emission levels in 2025 and 2030 resulting  
from the intended nationally determined con-
tributions [...] lead to a projected level of 55 gi-
gatonnes in 2030, and also notes that much  
greater emission reduction efforts will be re-
quired than those associated with the intended  
nationally determined contributions in order  
to hold the increase in the global average tem-
perature to below 2  C above pre-industrial lev-
els by reducing emissions to 40 gigatonnes [...]”  
(UNFCCC, 2016c, para. 17)  
While all of the national neutrality commit-
ments presented above are long-term com-
mitments and do not necessarily translate into 
ramping up short-term ambitions, they still rep-
resent some of the most ambitious mitigation 
commitments of all countries.  
The two non-state neutrality commitments por-
trayed above are even more ambitious as they 
feature much shorter timelines to achieve the 
neutrality objective. In the absence of suffi-
ciently strong national mitigation efforts, such 
initiatives can help lead the way and demon-
strate the viability of very ambitious mitigation
action. In its preamble the Paris Agreement ex-
plicitly recognizes the role of such initiatives, of 
actors of various governance levels beyond the 
national level. Moreover, in the decision adopt-
ing the Paris Agreement, Parties agreed to 
“uphold and promote regional and interna-
tional cooperation in order to mobilize strong-
er and more ambitious climate action by all 
Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including 
civil society, the private sector, financial institu-
tions, cities and other subnational authorities,
local communities and indigenous peoples.”
(UNFCCC, 2016c, p. 3)
While all of the presented cases truly are ambi-
tious commitments, the analysis shows that all 
rely to some extent on offsetting. Often, offset-
ting is portrayed as a fig leave or as a form of 
“greenwashing”, but the brief review of the cas-
es shows that this is not the case here. In fact, all 
three countries as well as the City of Melbourne 
and Microsoft first and foremost have taken 
measures to reduce their own emissions. At this
stage, offsetting remains necessary, because 
not all emissions are practically abatable.
For the credibility of commitments it is key that 
not any offset units are used but such units that 
meet high standards of environmental integrity 
and ideally come with significant sustainable 
development benefits beyond the reduction of 
GHGs. While it is beyond the scope of this Policy 
Brief to assess the quality of the used credits in 
detail, all of the cases reviewed have specified 
their own criteria for offset credits and rely on 
independently verified credits.
In the long run, however, the reliance on offsets 
may cause problems, because eventually global
economies and societies must find ways to 
phase out anthropogenic GHG emissions alto-










there will be simply no room for offsetting
through certified emission reductions or avoid-
ed emissions. These kind of offsets do not actu-
ally reduce the carbon content of the atmos-
phere but “correct” an otherwise less climate 
friendly development. In order to achieve the 
1.5°/2°C target, we need to get to a point in cli-
mate-compatible becomes the norm. Ultimate-
ly, only carbon sequestration projects that ac-
tively reduce the atmospheric GHG concen-
tration can ensure true neutrality (cf. Butler et 
al., 2015).
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However, for the time being, voluntary carbon 
neutrality goals are an effective way to demon-
strate leadership. For the foreseeable future, pi-
oneering actors that assume voluntary carbon 
or climate neutrality goals could provide a sig-
nificant source of demand for international car-
bon credits. If these credits are issued by mech-
anisms that align with the principles set out in 
the Paris Agreement, namely that they ensure 
the environmental integrity and promote sus-
tainable development (cf. UNFCCC, 2016b, Art.
6.1), this could even extend the benefit beyond 
the committing country, city, or company.  
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